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Book Review
LEGAL PHILOSOPHY FROM PLATO TO HEGEL. By Huntington
Cairns, Baltimore. The Johns Hopkins Press, 1949. Pp. 567.
The author's plan is a statement in separate chapters of
each philosopher's ideas, followed by his discussion and
criticism of such ideas. The footnotes give complete refer-
ences to the authorities so that any interested scholar can
judge whether or not, in his opinion, the work has been well
done. Though I am not competent to express a professional
opinion on the work of philosophers, the author's work is,
in my opinion, outstanding. To those who may be skeptical
of my view, I suggest that they test his plan and its execu-
tion by reading Chapter XII on Kant.
Philosophy began with the Greeks as an attempt to
satisfy man's rational curiosity about the world in which
he lives. A philosophy of law is an attempt to discover
universal principles in law, and thus far the greatest of
legal philosophers have failed in this task. The difficulty
lies in the inability of law as compared with the physical
sciences to conduct hypothetical experiments and thereby
test the validity of the hypotheses. Thus the difficulties are
all too apparent. Especially difficult is the test of "value",
and here we must either consider that we are at the mercy
of blind impulses or attempt by the methods of science to
discover the ethical and moral aspects of jurisprudence
(566). What is value, truth, law, right, happiness? Juris-
prudence is an attempt to answer these difficult questions
in terms of universal applicability (421, 452, 455, 462, 470,
476, 501, 507, 509, 511, 515, 535, 537, 548, 550, 551, 552).
Plato
Law in our sense of a complete system with professional
lawyers was unknown to the Greeks (29). Plato's idea was
that law was discovered and not invented (37). According
to Professor Cherniss of the Institute for Advanced Studies
at Princeton, this view was basic in Greek thought. Plato
thought that the end of law was to make man good and
to have group unity; yet he thought Democracy had gone
too far in Athens (50, 57, 92). He played with the idea of
the Philosopher King, that all good and all wise one who
never existed, and fell back on law as second best (39, 42,
115, 212, 352, 395). The making of men good by law is
certainly doubtful (98, 102, 181, 185, 274). Law, Plato
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thought, should be a "rigid rule adapted to the average
man and the general situation and incapable of dispensing
equity in the particular case" (40). Here we touch on
the danger of equity unless its application is also governed
by rules. "Individualization," which Pound suggests in his
"Interpretations of Legal Thought", gives us no rule and
seems to lead in the administrative agencies to uncertain
if not capricious results (40, 58, 108, 112, 117, 185, 196, 210,
216, 219, 234, 264, 368, 445, 543). Russia today, having de-
parted through gradual stages from pure Marxism, in which
there was to be no law, has now come to law and has put
into effect a code of laws based, in part, on the civil law
of Europe. But as a part of this law there are escape tech-
niques by which arbitrary and capricious decisions can
be made. (See "The Challenge of Soviet Law", by Harold
J. Berman, 62 Harvard Law Review, 220 et seq. and 449
et seq.) Our duty would seem to me to be to take our stand
for the rule of law laid down by Plato and then to focus
our efforts on the application of equitable rules and on
exceptions, which would prevent hardship but which should
be divorced from the arbitrary, and which should be pre-
dictable. We cannot too often repeat to the Marxists in'
our midst that our system is one of laws and not of men.
Reason, in which Plato believed, is suspect today as being
the slave of the passions, but this view has been over ex-
ploited by the Marxists, for unless man can fashion his
law by reason, how otherwise can he fashion it? (6, 8, 47, 94,
251, 275, 286, 365). As to practice, Plato correctly thought
that legal proceedings should be public. He believed, too,
in Courts having many judges; which certainly should be
the case in all appellate courts.
Aristotle
His systematization of logic with the syllogism is the
first example of the use of a precise scientific method in
the explanation of legal propositions. His was "the method
of hypothesis and verification", which is the method of
modern science (78, 79, 84, 96, 124, 228, 232, 554). He divided
the sciences into the theoretical, which had as their object
knowledge for its own sake, the practical, which sought
knowledge as a guide to conduct, and the productive, which
employed knowledge for the creation of beautiful or useful
objects. Precision, he thought, should not be looked for in
jurisprudence. It has to do with human affairs which are
contingent and not demonstrable (82). It can be approxi-
mate only. His method is accepted today in all empirical
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sciences (86). Aristotle thought that good laws tended
to make men better, though he knew it was hard to be good
(98). While "progress" in the popular sense is largely a
myth, yet despite the dreadful events of late years, there
has been improvement in time, though there is nothing to
show that law helped in this. One need only read Sir
John Pentland Mahaffy's "Greek Life and Thought" to be
convinced of improvement. That picture of the Hellenistic
world with its treachery, its cruelty and its unspeakable
vices seems to demonstrate that we do move forward
slowly.
Cicero
Cicero was a practicing lawyer, not a legal philosopher,
and his views are given because he had read deeply in
philosophy and because he filled a gap which otherwise
would have been left unfilled (X, 127). He was the first
to raise the question of "Why is jurisprudence worth study-
ing?" As a practicing lawyer, he knew and respected the
work which day by day was being done by lawyers. But
he had larger views, and thought that knowledge was im-
portant on its own account (130, 131). He attempted to
show the difference between the law of a State, "jus civile",
and the law of nature; sometimes confused with the "jus
gentium". The law of the State might include unjust pro-
visions, but this could not be so with natural law. This
is the difference between what the law is and what it 'ought'
to be; and where values are not agreed upon, this latter
is hard to define. It is interesting, however, to know that
his views are "even today the basis of a revival in juristic
thought" (142). Justice, Cicero thought, was the supreme
virtue, yet he was never able to give a good definition of
it. The theoretical arguments given against Justice are
interesting (143). Yet the ideal of Justice, like the ideal of
Christianity, while never fully achieved, is great and help-
ful as an ideal; and so it is with the opposites good and
bad. Croce, in his "History as the Story of Liberty", says
that the conscience of the human race has never set up other
standards than those called, "the beautiful, the true, the
useful and the good, together with their obvious synonyms",
and he follows with this challenge: "If anyone cares to pro-
pose or to discover other standards, let him say so and
have a try." It is illuminating to read Cicero's discussion
of the rules of interpretation (152, 156). I have always
thought that such rules are of but little value except as a
frame for the Court's decision. It seems to me in reading
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a document or a legislative act thought to be obscure, that
two persons of equal ability might well arrive at opposite
results as to its meaning. This is subjective, and when such
result is reached, then an appropriate rule of interpretation
is selected to support the result. The judges, it seems to me,
are in no way to blame for such a process in the field of
legal interpretation (265, 266, 543). It is, however, a little
disappointing to have the author say, "Inasmuch as numer-
ous principles can be suggested as the basis of any particu-
lar decision, it is foolish to assert that any particular case
decides a principle as its ratio decidendi" (88, 301, 308, 541).
To this I do not agree. If the author is right, then what
can be said of the legal profession and of our leading law
schools which have at great length praised the practice
of teaching law by the case system, which Langdell inaugu-
rated at the Harvard Law School. Cicero's ideally educated
man must be specially at home in literature, rhetoric, his-
tory, law and philosophy ( 161, 208, 306).
St. Thomas Aquinas
His philosophy of law was founded on a theological
basis. It was one of the great achievements of the 13th
century, and Von Jhering acclaims him as a mighty thinker
(163, 166, 204). For St. Thomas Aquinas law was an ordi-
nance of reason for the common good made by him who
has care of the community. To us, today, this is more the
description of an ideal, and we now have the ideas of
authority, experience, Volksgeist and utility (168, 169).
But his insistance on reason exists today in court decisions
which decide whether or not in particular cases what is,
or what is not, "reasonable". For St. Thomas Aquinas an
unreasonable law might bear the title of law but was not
a real law. His view of natural law was that man knows
the precepts of the natural law, not as a matter of faith,
but through a rational examination of his own nature (176).
Attractive as the idea of natural law is, and pointing as
it does to something which may be fundamental and uni-
versal, it still does not give us concrete help in particular
situations (175-184). Moral behavior is explained intrinsi-
cally in terms of the will directed by reason and habit. But
one extrinsic principle inclines to evil and is the devil;
the other moves to good and is God (167). But his basic
thought is still-"good is that which all things seek after"
(178). Man can be trained in virtue, he thought, but it
must be done gradually. No attempt should be made-"to
impose upon the multitude of imperfect men the burdens
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which are borne by the virtuous, viz., that they shall
abstain from evil" (191).
Bacon
Bacon'put his emphasis on method, saying "the mental
capacities of our predecessors were the equal of our own"
and so new scientific methods of inquiry are needed (206,
245). Philosophers, he said, make imaginary laws. Lawyers
write according to the country where they live and tell
what is, but not what "ought" to be, law (205). His "theory
of the origin of law and justice rests on the principle that
they are produced through the reaction of the group to
behavior held to affect the wellbeing of the whole commu-
nity" (211). This is surely better than Pound's "engineer-
ing interpretation", which seems to imply a distant but
certain end for law, to which it is moving. Bacon thought
that "certainty was the prime necessity of law" (217).
"The Courts should not be entrusted to the charge of one
man but should consist of many." "Decrees should not be
issued silently but the judges should give the reasons for
their decrees openly and in full court" (235).
Hobbes
The aim of man, Hobbes thought, was the assurance
of a contented life, which he does not define, and such a
life, he believed, could only be realized through power.
This power, he argues in a persuasive way, is not a mere
worship of power itself, "but because he cannot assure
the power and means to live well which he hath at present
without the acquisition of more" (251). The "contented
life" of Hobbes therefore would seem to be largely based
on materialism. Again he says that passions move man
to "a desire for gain, for safety, and for reputation" (252).
Just why reputation should form a part of his system is
not plain, for good and evil to him have no particular
meaning, and his morality is merely instructed prudence
(250, 257). Locks, he thinks, are a practical commentary
and criticism of man's nature (252, 258). While Hobbes
is best known for his view of the all powerful state, yet he
said, "In a way beset with those that contend on one side
for too great liberty, and on the other side for too much
authority, 'tis hard to pass between the points of both
unwounded" (259). Perhaps the attempt at the Golden
Mean is our only recourse (106, 121, 162, 197, 282, 318).
Hobbes did not believe in the rule of law, but favored the
rule of men, a position which seems to me to be absurd
(VOL. X
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(264). His view of the law as the command of the sov-
ereign, which Austin followed, is certainly correct in its
distinction between the law of the State and the ideal or
natural law (260, 269).
Spinoza
This great thinker made his livelihood polishing lenses.
His life interest was in philosophical speculation, and his
ideas are interesting and important. He "was cautious in
holding out any hope for improvement of the social lot of
man". And who shall say that he was wrong in that posi-
tion? He thought that "experience had revealed all possible
commonwealths which are consistent with men living in
unity and also the methods by which people may be guided
or kept in fixed bounds" (274). We Americans had thought
that our Constitutional system was such as to save us from
the eternal circle in which government seems to move
from authority to freedom and then from freedom to au-
thority and so on, ad infinitum. Yet in our own time
we have seen the great safeguards, which were deliberately
put into our Constitution to divide total power, rendered
useless, and we seem also to be going in the endless circle.
Spinoza's view that it takes great ability and care to form
and preserve a society is indeed only too true (278). The
end of law, he thought, was "the security of the individual
and the State" and the true aim of the State was liberty
(287, 289, 290). In a sense he was a "determinist", but he
takes refuge in the idea that man is at least the proximate
cause of society's decrees (279). He says too that while
the laws of a nation are subject to the operation of the
principle of determinism, we must act when we devise them
as if the principle did not apply (280). Hegel, while realiz-
ing that Spinoza's definitions and axioms were a great store-
house of speculative truth, nevertheless objected to his
system because of its presuppositions which permit sophisti-
cal reasoning (507).
Leibniz
When we get to the German thinkers, deep thought is
our fare. Hegel complained that philosophy merely served
up rewarmed dishes which were supplanted by each new
serving (507). Leibniz, like Bacon, was an experienced
lawyer (208). His idea of happiness seems at first to border
on the greatest happiness for the greatest number idea,
which I think Spencer refuted. For who is to select the
kind of happiness which will be such for the greatest
number? If, therefore, it means more than a decent scale
1949]
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of living in the material sense, I think it unsound. It could
be used by those who seize the power of the State to force
their brand of happiness on the rest of us. Leibniz at-
tempted a scientific system of two principles, the one de-
monstrable by the principle of contradiction and the other
by the principle of sufficient reason (295, 334). He regarded
the syllogism as the most fruitful of human inventions,
but the difficulty of formulating premises in the philosophy
of law remains (300, 305, 311). He was surely right in
saying that "Law should be taught both as a science and
as a practical discipline". It is hard indeed to see how there
could be a creative judge who lacked either of the qualities
which should come with such teaching. That Leibniz was
not in fact a coarse utilitarian in the sense that Bentham
was is clear enough. Power cannot, he saw, answer the
question, "Why?" and to put right and might on the same
plane is the misconception of the relationship between "is"
and "ought" (313). The rules of fairness and decency rested,
he thought, on eternal reasons, which usually cannot be
known to us (295, 312). Reason and will lead to happiness
through pleasure. On the road we may miss the true goal,
yet basically, he believed, pleasure is a feeling of per-
fection, and pain, a feeling of imperfection (329).
Locke
Although Locke wrote on philosophical subjects, yet in
his speculations on the State he accepted the views of his
time. He made no attempt philosophically to justify the
ideas on which his system rested (335, 337, 361). Locke's
view was that government must necessarily be limited
(347, 355, 357). The rule of established law decided by
upright judges and the protection of property he considered
important (351, 352, 360). While he insisted on reason, his
view of human character made him believe that govern-
ment was necessary and that it should be limited govern-
ment (353). Locke said, "Law in its true notion, is not so
much the limitation as the direction of a free and intelli-
gent agent to his proper intent and prescribes no farther
than is for the general good under the law . . . so that
however it may be mistaken, the end of law is not to abolish
or restrain but to preserve and enlarge freedom" (360).
Hume
Philosophy, he complained, had been little more than a
succession of endless disputes (362). He agreed with
Spinoza that human nature was not modifiable (363). His
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attempt was to apply scientific methods in estimating hu-
man affairs. This was to be done by a study of history
and by using the inductive method. The weakness in this
theory appears to be that differing views of history would
lead to differing results (364). Reason, he thought, was
and ought to be the slave of the passions. Yet he thought
that men had a "moral sense" (367). His theory of Justice
was a legal rather than an ethical one. General peace
and order are the attendants of Justice. Legal rules are
intended to serve the public interest. It is impossible for
them to prevent all hardships. It is enough if on the
whole a balance of good preponderates over evil. Law thus
made should be administered inflexibly (368). While he
believed that utility was at the bottom of civil society, it
was surely not Bentham's idea of utility (366, 374, 375, 376).
He was firm in his belief in the right of property (351, 373,
374, 378).
Kant
A great metaphysical thinker, Kant based his system
on the will, or rather the "good will". The will, he thought,
was autonomous and could legislate for itself, which seems
to me to be difficult to fit in with his search for universal
laws which control us. The senses and the intellect are
confined merely to the world of experience. The idea of
"ought" in man is unique and is found nowhere else in
nature. "Ought" operates in the inner world of the moral
self. Kant's system included two commands: (1) A hypo-
thetical imperative acted on not because of its merit
(ought) but to reach some practical end. (2) A categorical
imperative acted on because of its own merits and not as a
means to something else (392). See, too, Leibniz (313) and
Bacon (205). Locke was contra (350). Fitche, too, believed
in the categorical command of morality but kept separate
the idea of morality from law (473). Yet Kant to an extent
was a determinist in thinking that mankind did not ad-
vance by a rational conscious purpose. He thought, how-
ever, that there was a slow development from man's
original capacities pursuant to universal natural laws. It
was his belief that an attempt should be made to discover
such universal laws (393). Spengler and Toynbee have
attempted this task of late years. Kant thought that it is
precisely because man is anti-social that law and the State
appear, and that because man's anti-social tendencies are
controlled by law, leaving him still room for his ambition
to work, that he is able to advance (394). Hegel agrees,
1949]
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saying that if mankind lived in a state of nature, the mental
would be submerged in the natural (533). Compare Soc-
rates and Thoreau. Kant concluded, therefore, that the
greatest practical problem of the human race is the estab-
lishment of a civil society administering "right" according
to law (395). His idea was that the best society was one
wherein the greatest liberty existed and therefore compe-
tition among its members, with an exact determination of
the limits of this liberty (395, 410). Public Justice he
recognized for what it is, i.e. the most important of the
functions of the State; the selection of those to administer
justice being a difficult and uncertain task (395). Kant's
idea of right was the external act, and he was dubious
about equity (402, 407). He strongly believed in the idea
of property. His idea was not that a contract "ought" to be
kept, but because it was the result of united willing by
both sides (425, 429). As to the State, he believed in the
separation of the powers (441, 444, 446). He thought the
welfare of the group more important than the welfare of
the citizens. But this is surely wrong, for the welfare of
the State means the welfare of the citizens, and where
would Kant's idea of "freedom" be if it were otherwise,
and the citizens were mere pawns under the power of the
State (438, 448-450)? As to criminal law, Kant's view
was that retribution is the only rational plan (453). For
those who are confident of their views on crime, a study
of the views of the greatest thinkers will make them less
dogmatic. See Hegel (494); Peirce, (561).
Fichte
His central thought was that man's thinking is based on
experience and this consists of ideas of things, that is
aspects both subjective and objective. He thought philoso-
phy had two possible systems-idealism and dogmatism-
the first attempts to explain the thing in terms of the idea,
and the second explains the idea in terms of the thing.
Idealism was Fichte's philosophy, as he thought that dog-
matism could not explain the gulf between things and ideas
(465). His system of "ego", "non-ego" and "divisible ego"
is difficult abstract thought. Yet he was practical enough
to hold that even a perfected philosophical system must
be adjusted to the facts of experience. His legal system is
built on the idea of relation between human beings in an
organized society. In this relationship each individual must
be required to restrict his freedom in recognition of the
possibility of the freedom of others (469). Though Fichte
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recognized the "ought", he divorced law from ethics and
morality (473). Law permits, morality commands cate-
gorically, and the rational being, if he disobeys the law,
must take the consequences. The end of law is a community
of free beings, but this can only be if these free beings
are limited in their freedom by the law laid down by the
State, and this is "Right" (477). He thought that man could
be made happy by law; a theory of the Socialists (480).
There must be no poor men and no idlers (492). He re-
jected democracy and despotism in favor of a representa-
tive government and also believed in the separation of
the powers (490, 491).
Hegel
His difficult theory is the triad, "being", "nothing" and
"becoming". Abstractly, "being", devoid of all qualities, is
"nothing", yet there is an assertion that a thing both is
and is not, and searching for the unity of opposites we
find that a thing both is and is not in "becoming" (506).
Philosophy's duty is to establish the rationality of law or
"Right". It is an effort to apprehend the actual. Hegel
regards caprices of fancy and evil as existent but not actual,
which seems to me to be an assumption. Hegel's attempt
was apparently to determine whether a law was morally
valid. His was a highly abstract theory which includes
identity of opposites, also concepts and ideas much too
subtle for a mere lawyer to explain. He admitted the
equality of men as persons, but with different capacities,
so that the amount of a person's possessions was a matter
of indifference (522). Contracts are based on external acts
and not states of mind (524-525). Hegel thought that legal
principles should be expressed in a code rather than to have
a code as a mere collection of laws. He thought the con-
fusion in English case law was due to the fact that English
judges were essentially legislators (536).
In a skeptical age, when young men on the threshholds
of their lives are often discouraged, it is heartening to
know of the zeal and scholarship of Huntington Cairns. We
lawyers in Maryland are proud to know that he is also a
Maryland lawyer. In no sense, however, is he parochial.
He is in fact an authentic intellectual whose wide learning
and depth of thought qualify him as being one to be known
and admired in the company of scholars everywhere.
-WALTEm H. BucK*
*Of the Baltimore City Bar.
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